summer book review: semiotics

Foundations of the Theory of Signs - Charles Morris (1938)

A thin magenta book with worn edges and creases half an inch up the spine; notes in the margins reflect thoughts of a Reader, presumed Gus Baird (p. 12, cursive). As described, foundations---definitions, framework, and taxonomy of the field rather than case studies or detailed considerations.

lang. rules come from	properties of the world	(that we use lang to describe)
	and also from ourselves	(our nature as lang users)

Since there are other books to read for you and I, basics will help us both. Well, I was getting rusty, and a colleague dropped the S-bomb yesterday.

Semiotics is the study of signs. Signs function in the process of semiosis, described as a relation with three requirements:

sign vehicle - which acts as a sign (a stop sign)
designatum - which is referred to (the place to stop, or the act of stopping)
interpretant - effect on the interpreter of the semiosis (he stops, or refuses to stop)

and several optionals

interpreter - one affected by the semiosis (the driver)
denotatum - object referred to, if it exists (the designatum is abstract, no denotatum)

Furthermore, author presents three dimensions:

semantics (D_sem) - relations of signs to their objects - includes direct or literal meaning
pragmatics (D_p) - relations of signs to interpreters - includes cultural factors concerning sign use
syntactics (D_syn) - relations of signs of one another - includes what patterns of signs allowed

and three types of signs

indexical - point at something in particular "this"
characterizing - denotes a group of objects "man"
universal - can denote anything "something"

The text runs in thoughtful contemplation of each of these dimensions, the aim of each to propose syntactical, semantical, and pragmatical rules. We are given examples of painted men, snarling dogs, and the famous fire in the crowded theater. After pages of theory it almost concludes hopefully with a section on experience relations:

The important point is that such a conclusion would not be in opposition to the potential intersubjectivity of every meaning. The fact that y₁ and y₂ do not stand in the relation of direct experience to each other's respective direct experience of x₁ does not prevent them both from directly experiencing x₁, or from indirectly designating (and so indirectly experiencing) by the use of signs the experience relations in which the other stands---for under certain circumstances an object which cannot be directly experienced can, nevertheless, be denoted.

Hopefully, I take this to mean---despite our different experiences and sign vocabularies, through a tangle of signs of you experiencing me experiencing your explanations---through iteration and eventual exhaustion of these signs, we can eventually begin to understand each other. Or the possibility is not ruled out.